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Abstract:
The paper examines under what conditions vertically di¤erentiated duopolists
engage in rst-degree price discrimination. Each rm decides on a pricing regime
at a rst stage, and sets prices at a second stage. The paper shows that when
unit cost is an increasing and convex function of quality, the discriminatory
regime is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of such two-stage game. In
contrast to the case of horizontal di¤erentiation, the discriminatory equilibrium
is not necessarily Pareto-dominated by a bilateral commitment to uniform pric-
ing. Also, the quality choices of perfectly discriminating duopolists are welfare
maximizing. The paper also explains why a threat of entry may elicit price
discrimination by an incumbent monopolist.
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1 Introduction
Until recently, economists viewed rst-degree discrimination as a theoretical
construct without real world applications. The primary reason was that sellers
did not possess information about the reservation prices of individual buyers.
Unsurprisingly, the literature on rst-degree-discrimination remained scarce. A
notable exception arose in spatial economics. Because distance could be ob-
served, and correlated with transportation cost, the spatial economics literature
often assumed that the mill price a seller could charge a buyer increased with
the distance that separated him from that buyer (Hurter and Lederer, 1985,
Lederer and Hurter, 1986, Thisse and Vives, 1988, Hamilton and Thisse, 1992,
Ulph and Vulkan, 2000, 2001, Bhaskar and To, 2004).
Perceptions about the practicality of rst-degree-discrimination have changed.
The change has coincided with advances in information gathering/processing
techniques, and the proliferation of computer-mediated transactions. (Shapiro
and Varian, 1999, Varian, 2003). It has spawned a literature that explores how
on-line sellers exploit information about consumer preferences to personalize
prices and product specications (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000, Acquisti and
Varian, 2001, Varian, 2003).1
The improved capacity to gather and process information has also inuenced
pricing in traditional trading environments. Personalized discounting has be-
come common at the check-out counter where sellers tailor promotional o¤ers to
current purchases.2 Financial institutions also engage in personalization when
they customize o¤ers to clientsnet worth and payment history. Similarly, jour-
nal publishers adapt on-line subscription fees to the characteristics of individual
academic libraries.3
A particular form of personalized pricing takes place in aftermarkets where
rms earn high margins from the sale of parts whose wear and tear increases
with intensity of use.4 And, in markets for intellectual property, personalized
pricing did not await the emergence of on-line technologies. Royalties have
traditionally depended on intensity of use.
Clearly, sellerscapacity to engage in personalized pricing also depends on
their ability to restrict reselling by rst buyers. To limit reselling, some software
rms do not transfer ownership of their products; they grant consumers a non-
transferable right to use their products. Personalization of prices also requires
that sellerscosts not increase too fast as the number of price categories expands.
Because on-line technologies facilitate customization in the absence of face-to-
1The terms personalized pricing and rst-degree price discrimination are used inter-
changeably. First-degree price discrimination as used by Pigou(1920) refers to pricing that
takes place when full information about consumersdemand is available and allows sellers to
tailor prices to individual consumers. It does not necessarily describe a situation where all
consumer surplus is captured by the producer(s) (See Stole, 2003).
2Some of the techniques used in online retailing are described at
http://www.accenture.com/Global/Services/
Accenture_Technology_Labs/R_and_I/PersonalizedPricingTool.htm
3See Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004)
4See e.g. Emch (2003)
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face contact, they are equally valuable in this regard.
Although rst-degree price discrimination remains a limiting case, on-line
technologies allow a form of pricing which, in some markets, approaches rst-
degree price discrimination.
This paper examines personalized pricing in a market served by a quality-
di¤erentiated duopoly. It addresses four questions. (1) What are the properties
of the non-cooperative equilibrium in which each duopolist sets a perfectly dis-
criminating price schedule? (2) Under what conditions would rms prefer to
engage in personalized pricing even if had the means to enforce an agreement
to price uniformly? (3) Does rst-degree price discrimination perform better in
terms of consumer and total welfare than uniform pricing? (4) How do the
quality choices of perfectly discriminating duopolists measure up in terms of
welfare?
The paper addresses these questions in a framework similar to Thisse and
Vives (1988). It nds that a transition from uniform to discriminatory pricing
a¤ects prots via two channels: An enhanced capacity to extract surplus from
some buyers, and an intensication of competition for the patronage of other
buyers.5 However, the results di¤er from Thisse and Vives (1988) in regard
to the existence of a prisoners dilemma. Thisse and Vives (1988) found that
when di¤erentiation is horizontal, both duopolists are better o¤ by enforcing
an agreement to price uniformly. This paper nds that when di¤erentiation
is vertical, the Nash equilibrium in discriminatory price schedules need not be
Pareto dominated by such agreement. Specically, it shows that a prisoners
dilemma arises if and only if the ratio of market areas served by the two rms
lies within an interval whose bounds can be calculated using generally observable
data.
While the paper is formally close to Choudhary et al. (2005), it is di¤erent
in spirit and addresses a wider set of issues. Choudhary et al. (2005) focus
on the comparison of prices and qualities under alternative exogenously given
pricing regimes. This paper by constrast, determines a pricing regime as an
equilibrium strategy. It also assumes a more general distribution of consumer
preferences, and a more general cost function. 6
Section 2 introduces the model and section 3 characterizes the equilibrium
that emerges from the simultaneous choice of discriminatory price schedules by
the duopolists. It establishes that personalized prices are not monotonic in con-
sumerswillingness to pay. It shows why competition in discriminatory price
schedules yields a welfare maximizing market coverage, and a welfare maxi-
mizing partition of the market into buyers of high and low quality. Section 4
addresses the question whether discrimination by the duopolists is an equilib-
rium strategy when the pricing regime is endogenous. Section 5 shows that in
contrast to the case of horizontal di¤erentiation, prior commitments by both
rms to set uniform prices do not necessarily enhance prots. Section 6 en-
5Ulph and Vulkan (2000) develop a similar model. They nd that a switch from uniform
pricing to discriminatory pricing boosts prots when transport cost increases rapidly with
distance.
6The di¤erences are examined in greater detail in the body of paper.
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dogenizes the choice of qualities and establishes that duopolists who engage in
discriminatory pricing set qualities that maximize welfare. Section 7 provides
concluding remarks and examines implications for competition policy.
2 The model
Consider a market in which two rms serve a continuum of consumers. The
size of the market is normalized to one. Each rm produces a single variety
of a vertically di¤erentiated product. For convenience the varieties are called
high qualityand low quality and denoted sH and sL; where sH > sL > 0:
The producers of these qualities are caleld the high (H) and the low (L) quality
rms.
Consumers have preferences à la Mussa-Rosen (1978). Each consumer is
identied by a taste parameter  2 [0; b] distributed with positive and continuous
density f() over the interval [0; b]. A consumer buys a single unit of high or
low quality, or nothing at all. Consumer 0s reservation price for a single unit of
quality si is si (i 2 fH;Lg). Consumer  gets a surplus si  pi() from a unit
of quality si purchased at the price pi(); and a zero surplus from no purchase.
Consumers cannot resell to other consumers.
The cost of producing qi units of quality si is C(si; qi) = c(si)qi where c(si)
denotes the unit cost of quality si. The function c(:) is twice di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing, and strictly convex. Specically :
c(0) = 0; c0(s) > 0; c00(s) > 0;8s > 0 (1)
The latter implies:
0 <
c(sL)
sL
<
c(sH)
sH
<
c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL ; 8sH > sL > 0 (2)
Because the paper focuses on producerschoices among pricing regimes, it
assumes that both rms are active under all regimes considered in the paper.
This condition is met when (3) below is sased
b >
c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL ; 8sH > sL > 0 (3)
Throughout the paper, the term price schedule refers to a positive valued
function pi(:) dened on [0; b] that species the price pi() at which rm i is
willing to sell one unit to consumer : A price schedule is uniform when a single
price targets all consumers. It is perfectly discriminating or personalized, when
the component prices vary according to the taste parameter of each individual
consumers that they target.
The paper examines four pricing regimes. Under the uniform regime, de-
noted (UH ; UL), both rms set uniform price schedules. Under the discrimina-
tory regime, denoted (DH ; DL), both rms set discriminatory price schedules.
The remaining regimes, denoted (UH ; DL) and (DH ; UL), are asymmetric. One
rm sets a uniform price acting as a Stackelberg leader, while the other rm
sets a perfectly discriminating schedule.
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3 Regime (DH ; DL)
For any pair of price schedules (pH(:); pL(:)), the market areas served by rms
H and L are :
H(pH(:); pL(:)) = f 2 [0; b]=sH   pH() Max[0; sL   pL()]g (4)
L(pH(:); pL(:)) = f 2 [0; b]=sL   pL() Max[0; sH   pH()]g (5)
Therefore, rm i0s prots (i 2 fH;Lg) are:
i(pH(:); pL(:)) =
Z
i(pH(:);pL(:))
[pi()  c(si)]f()d (6)
Firm i is said to have a monopoly position with respect to consumer  if for any
price schedule chosen by the rival rm j, it can attract that consumer with a
price si that captures the entire surplus. Firm i is said to have a cost-quality
advantage over its rival j with respect to consumer  if there exists a price
pi() at which it can attract consumer  when the rival j targets consumer 
with a price equal to its unit cost c(sj). Clearly, a rm that holds a monopoly
position with respect to a consumer also holds a cost-quality advantage over its
rival with respect to the same consumer. The converse is not true.
Proposition 1 characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game in which
both rms independently choose the discriminatory regime.
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium of the game in discriminatory price sched-
ules with payo¤s given by (6) is the pair (pH(); p

L()) dened by (7) and (8)
below where pH() and pL() are any price schedules above unit costs.
pH() =
8><>:
c(sL) + (sH   sL) if c(sH) c(sL)sH sL    b
c(sH) if
c(sH)
sH
  < c(sH) c(sL)sH sL
pH()  c(sH) if 0   < c(sH)sH
(7)
pL() =
8>>><>>>:
c(sL) if
c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL    b
c(sH)  (sH   sL) if c(sH)sH   <
c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL
sL if
c(sL)
sL
  < c(sH)sH
pL()  c(sL) if 0   < c(sL)sL
(8)
Proof :
Under perfect discrimination each consumer pays a price determined solely
by that consumers preference for quality. This follows immediately from the
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assumptions that reselling among consumers is impossible, and that unit cost
is independent of quantity. No rm sells below unit cost to any consumer
because doing so does not allow it to earn a larger prot from another consumer.
Therefore, competition in discriminatory price schedules adds up to a collection
of Bertrand games for individual consumers.
One can now examine the equilibrium in four market segments, using the
simplied notation cH for c(sH) and cL for c(sL):
1.  2
h
cH cL
sH sL ; b
i
When pL() = cL consumers derive positive surplus from purchasing low
quality. The highest price pH() at which they would purchase high quality
satises the condition sH   pH() = sL   cL which implies (7). When the
H -rm sets pH() = cL+ (sH   sL); consumers obtain a surplus sL  cL from
high quality. They would purchase low quality only if it were priced below unit
cost, which is non protable. Therefore, pL() = cL is an optimal response by
rm L to the schedule pH(). Firm H enjoys a cost-quality advantage over rm
L, but no monopoly position, with respect to all consumers in the interval.
2.  2 [ cHsH ; cH cLsH sL [
For pL() = cH   (sH   sL) consumers in the interval obtain a surplus
sH   cH from low quality. Firm H can attract these consumers only by pricing
below unit cost. Because this yields a negative prot without producing a com-
pensatory increase in prots from consumers in other intervals, a best response of
rm H is to set the price cH . And, when pH() = cH ; the highest price at which
rm L can attract consumers satises the condition sL   pL() = sH   cH
which implies (7). Clearly, rm L has a cost-quality advantage but no monopoly
position with respect to consumers in this interval.
3.  2 [ cLsL ; cHsH [:
All price schedules above unit cost are optimal for rm H because rm L
holds a monopoly position in the interval. The best response of rm L is to set
pL() = sL which allows its capture of the entire consumer surplus.
4.  2 [0; cLsL [
Within this interval no rm can attract a consumer by pricing at unit cost
or higher. This is true for any price schedule chosen by the rival producer. All
pairs of schedules with no component below unit cost ensure zero sales and are
therefore equilibria. QED
Substitution of (7) and (8) into (6) yields the equilibrium prots:
H(DH ; DL) =
Z b
cH cL
sH sL
[cL + (sH   sL)  cH ]f()d (9)
L(DH ; DL) =
Z cH
sH
cL
sL
[sL cL]f()d+
Z cH cL
sH sL
cH
sH
[cH (sH sL) cL]f()d(10)
Figure 1 displays the equilibrium.7 The lines labeled sH and sL represent
7 In the space (; p), the coordinates of points T , L, V;K, M and I are T =
cH
sH
; pT =
6
the participation constraints for high and low quality buyers. The line segment
KM is the self-selection constraint faced by the high quality rm when its rival
sells at unit cost. Similarly, the line segment TL represents the self-selection
constraint faced by the low quality rm when its rival o¤ers high quality at unit
cost. The high quality rm serves the market segment [ cH cLsH sL ; b] and sets the
price schedule represented by KM . The low quality rm divides the consumers
it serves into two segments. With respect to consumers with  2 [ cLsL ; cHsH [ it sets
prices at which the participation constraint is binding (V T in Figure 1). With
respect to consumers with  2] cHsH ; cH cLsH sL ] it sets prices at which the consumers
self-selection constraint binds (TL in Figure 1). Note that the price paid by
these consumers decreases when their reservation price increases. This result is
akin to the absorption e¤ect in the Thisse and Vives (1988) model .
The prot earned by the high quality rm from an individual consumer is
represented by the vertical distance between the line segment KM and the hor-
izontal line cH . Because the total prot is a weighted sum of these distances
on the segment
h
cH cL
sH sL ; b
i
, we say that H(DH ; DL) is area(KMI); keep-
ing in mind that the area is properly dened by the integral (9). Similarly,
L(DH ; DL) is area(V TL).
Proposition 1 entails the following:
cH
sL
sH
, L =
cH cL
sH sL ; pL = cL; V =
cL
sL
; pV = cL, K =
cH cL
sH sL ; pK = cH , M = b;
pM = cL + b(sH   sL) and I = b; pI = cH :
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Corollary 2 Personalized prices competition by quality di¤erentiated duopolists
(regime (DH ; DL)) yields a market coverage and a segmentation of consumers
into high and low quality buyers that maximize total welfare.
Proof:
Each unit sold to yields a positive total surplus larger than the total surplus
that would be have been generated from a sale to the same consumer of a unit
of the other quality. This follows from the fact that a consumer who purchases
low quality must gain less in utility from switching to high quality than would
be added in to the cost production. Similarly, a consumer of high quality would
lose more in utility from switching to low quality than the saving in production
cost.
4 Selecting a price policy.
One can now address the question whether price discrimination is an equilibrium
of a game in which rms can commit to price uniformly. Consider a three-stage
game. In the rst stage, each rm chooses whether to commit to a uniform
schedule. If the two rms commit, they sell at the second stage at the prices
they committed to. This is the regime (UH ; UL). If no rm commits in the rst
period, each remains free to set any price schedule in the second stage. This is
the regime (DH ; DL). If one of the duopolists commits at the rst stage, it acts
as a Stackelberg leader at the second stage, while the other acts as a follower.
These asymmetric regimes are denoted (UH ; DL) and (DH ; UL).8 In all regimes,
consumers make their purchasing decisions at the last stage.
Committing to a uniform price can only be rational if it elicits a pricing
response on the part of the rival that is favorable to the rm that makes the
commitment. The credibility of such commitment may derive from sunk invest-
ments in a distribution channel that puts intermediaries between manufacturers
and consumers and does not allow the former to ascertain individual consumer
preferences. It can arise from a most-favored-customer clause granted by the
seller. It may also rest on a threat of reputational losses that would ensue
from backing down on the pre-announced uniform price. It is assumed that the
rms committing to a uniform price take measures that lend credibility to their
commitment. However these measures are not modeled.
8We show in appendix 1 that there does not exist a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
within the framework of a static game where the high quality rm chooses a uniform price
and the low quality rm chooses a perfectly discriminating price schedule. Thisse and Vives
(1988) nd the same for horizontal di¤erentiation.
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4.1 Regime (UH ; DL)
Suppose that the H-rm sets a uniform price pH > cH . The best response of
the L-rm when is:
pL(; pH) =
8>>><>>>:
cL if
pH c(sL)
sH sL    b
pH   (sH   sL) if pHsH   <
c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL
sL if
c(sL)
sL
  < pHsH
pL()  c(sL) if 0   < c(sL)sL
(11)
The prots are
L(pH ; pL(:)) =
Z pH
sH
cL
sL
[sL cL]f()d+
Z pH cL
sH sL
pH
sH
[pH (sH sL) cL]f()d (12)
H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) =
Z b
pH cL
sH sL
[pH   cH ]f()d (13)
Because H is a continuous function of pH ; there exists a pH that maximizes
H over the compact set [cH ; bsH ] : The Stackelberg equilibrium of the game
where the H and L-rms act respectively as a leader and a follower is the pair
(pH ; pL(; p

H)) where pL(; pH) is given by (11).
Figure 2 displays the prots L(pH ; pL(:)) as area(V AB) and
H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) as area(FGIN).
9
Because cLsL <
cH
sH
< cH cLsH sL <
pH cL
sH sL , it must be true that V TL  V AB
or L(DH ; DL) < L(pH ; pL(:)): For the same reason, FGIN  KMI or
H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) < H(DH ; DL): One can therefore conclude that a high
quality rm that commits to the uniform price pH > cH while its rival does
not commit, earns less than it would earn if no one committed. This is true
despite the fact that commitment bestows upon the high quality rm a role of
Stackelberg leader.
Upon dening pH = arg max
pH2[cH ;bsH ]
H(pH ; pL(:; pH)); one can write
H(UH ; DL)  H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) and L(UH ; DL)  L(pH ; pL(:; pH))
with pL(; pH) given by (11).
Because H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) < H(DH ; DL) holds true for any pH > cH it
holds true for pH as well. Therefore:
H(UH ; DL) < H(DH ; DL) (14)
and
L(UH ; DL) > L(DH ; DL) (15)
Figure 2 claries the di¤erences between the (UH ; DL) and (DH ; DL) regimes:
i) Commitment by rm H to a uniform price pH > cH shifts the self-selection
constraint faced by the low quality rm upward (from TL to AB) and shortens
the self-selection constraint faced by the high quality rm (from KM to FM);
ii) the market coverage is the same under the two regimes although the mar-
ket area served by the high quality rm is smaller under (UH ; DL) regime than
under the (DH ; DL) regime, and the market served by the low quality rm is
larger9 ; iii) the market area of the low quality buyers who retain no surplus is
larger under the (UH ; DL) regime than under the (DH ; DL) regime.
4.2 Regime (DH ; UL)
Assume that the L-rm sets a uniform price pL > cL: Clearly pL  cH cannot
be sustained as an equilibrium because the H-rm could undercut the L-rm,
capture the market served by the L-rm, and increase its prot by doing so.
When the low quality rm commits to a uniform price pL 2 (cL; cH) the best
response of the high quality producer depends on whether  is larger or smaller
than cH pLsH sL : For  <
cH pL
sH sL , any schedule pH()  cH yields zero sales and is
therefore a best response. Thus, the best response of rm H to pL 2 (cL; cH) is
:
pH(; pL) =

pL + (sH   sL) for  2 [ cH pLsH sL ; b]
pH()  cH for  < cH pLsH sL
(16)
9This comes about because the rm that commits has no interest in competing agressively
for consumers who are more or less indi¤erent between the two qualities when each is priced
at unit cost. The reason it does not is that it would have to accept a lower margin on sales
to consumers with a strong preference for its quality.
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Prots are:
H(pH(:; pL); pL) =
Z b
cH pL
sH sL
[pL + (sH   sL)  cH ]f()d (17)
L(pH(:; pL); pL) =
Z cH pL
sH sL
pL
sL
(pL   cL) f () d (18)
Note that the condition pLsL <
cH pL
sH sL which ensures positive sales for the
L-rm [see (18)] is equivalent to sLpL >
sH
cH
: Using the same arguments as for
regime (DL; UH) one can show
H(pH(:; pL); pL) > H(DH ; DL) and
L(pH(:; pL); pL) < L(DH ; DL) which imply
L(DH ; UL) < L(DH ; DL)(19)
and
H(DH ; UL) > H(DH ; DL) (20)
One observes the following di¤erences between the (DH ; UL) and the (DH ; DL)
regimes: 1) Total market coverage is smaller under the (DH ,UL) regime; ii) the
segment served by the low quality rm is smaller under the (DH ; UL) regime
whereas the segment served by the high quality producer is larger.
4.3 Regime (UH ; UL)
This is the standard regime examined in the literature. The concavity of f()
over [0; b] is a su¢ cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium for an ar-
bitrary distribution of consumer preferences:10 It is assumed that this condition
is met.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium in uniform prices together with (14) and
(19) imply the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For any concave density function f(); personalization of prices
is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the three-stage game where: i/ vertically dif-
ferentiated duopolists determine whether or not to commit to a specic uniform
price in a rst stage; ii) in the second stage a rm that commited acts as a Stack-
elberg leader stage vis-a-vis a rm that did not commit, and if no one commited,
both simultaneously set their price schedules; iii) in the third stage consumers
make their purchases.
For a general density function one cannot compare the prots under this
equilibrium with the prots generated under a mutual commitment to price
uniformly. To compare prots under the two pricing regimes, the next section
assumes a specic density function.
10See Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2005)
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5 A prisoners dilemma?
The nding that price personalization constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium
is the counterpart for quality di¤erentiation of the Thisse and Vives (1998)
result for horizontal di¤erentiation. Thisse and Vives (1998) also established
that spatially di¤erentiated duopolists would be better o¤ if they enforced an
agreement to set uniform prices. This section shows for the particular case of a
uniform distribution of consumer preferences - also studied by Thisse and Vives
- that discrimination need not be Pareto dominated by uniform pricing when
di¤erentiation is vertical.
.
Table 1 displays the prots of the high and low quality rms for each of the
four pricing regimes for uniform f(:).11
DH ; DL
H =
sH sL
2b [b  cH cLsH sL ]2
L =
sL
2b [
cH cL
sH sL   cLsL ][ cHsH   cLsL ]
DH ; UL
H =
sH sL
2b [b  12 ( cH cLsH sL + cHsH )]2
L =
sL
4b [
cH
sH
  cLsL ][ cH cLsH sL   cLsL ]
UH ; DL
H =
sH sL
4b [b  cH cLsH sL ]2
L =
1
2b
sL(sH sL)
sH
[ 12 (b+
cH cL
sH sL )  cLsL ]2
UH ; UL
H =
4s2H(sH sL)
(4sH sL)2b [b  12 ( cH cLsH sL + cHsH )]2
L =
4sLsH(sH sL)
(4sH sL)2b [
1
2 (b+
cH cL
sH sL )  cLsL ]2
Table 1: Prots under four pricing regimes with uniform density
One shows rst that the Nash equilibrium (DH ; DL) is an equilibrium in
dominant strategies: It has already been established that H(DH ; DL) >
H(UH ; DL) and L(DH ; DL) > L(DH ; UL) for any distribution f(): Ta-
ble 1 now shows that for a uniform f(); H(DH ; DL) = 2H(UH ; DL) and
L(DH ; DL) = 2L(DH ; UL).12 Moreover, one easily checks that 0 < sL <
sH entails 14 <
4s2H
(4sH sL)2 <
4
9 implying H(DH ; UL) > H(UH ; UL) and
L(UH ; DL) > L(UH ; UL): Therefore, DH and DL are dominant strategies for
players H and L.
11Appendix 2 gives the details of the derivation of Table 1.
12 In this regard Choudhary et al.(2005) make a computational mistake in the calculation
of H(UH ; DL) which leads them to conclude that it is equal to H(DH ; DL) [See their
expressions (2) and (5)[.
12
Dene now   sL=sH ; and   (b  cH cLsH sL )=( cH cLsH sL   cLsL ); i.e. represents
the ratio of market segments served by the two rms under the regime (DH ; DL).
Consider the following intermediate result:
Lemma: There exist two functions FH() 
p
2
4 2p2  and FL()  4 2
p
2 p
2
such that H(DH ; DL) > H(UH ; UL) if and only if  > FH() and
L(DH ; DL) > L(UH ; UL) if and only if  < FL().
Proof : See appendix 3.
The functions FH and FL which intersect for  = 0:343 partition the (; )
space into the four regions shown in Figure 3.
In region 1 where  and  are such that FH() <  < FL(); the (DH ; DL)
regime Pareto-dominates the (UH ; UL) regime.
In region 2 where  > max[FH(); FL()] rm H is better o¤ under the
(DH ; DL) regime whereas rm L prefers the (UH ; UL) regime.
The opposite is true in region 3 where  < min[FH(); FL()]:13 It is only
in region 4 where
FL() <  < FH() that the regime (DH ; DL) is Pareto dominated by the
regime (UH ; UL): Thus:
13 It is straigthforward to show that for c(s) = s2 a prisoners dilemma occurs for b 2
]2:45; 2:55[ when sH = 1; sL = 0:5 and for b 2]1:63; 1:9[ when sH = 1; sL = 0:25:
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Proposition 4 When consumer preferences are uniform over [0,b] and unit
cost is a convex function of quality, the discriminatory pricing regime is Pareto
dominated by the uniform regime if and only if the following conditions hold:
i/   0:343 and
ii/ b 2
h
FL()(
cH cL
sH sL   cLsL ) + cH cLsH sL ; FH()( cH cLsH sL   cLsL ) + cH cLsH sL
i
While discrimination allows the extraction of more surplus from a rst group
of buyers, uniform pricing o¤ers the advantage of less intense competition for the
patronage of a second group of buyers. In the rst group one nds the consumers
who have a strong preference for a particular quality when the two qualities are
o¤ered at unit cost. The second group is made up of consumers with a weak
preference for a particular quality when the two qualities are o¤ered at unit cost.
A necessary condition for both rms to be better o¤ under discriminatory pric-
ing is that each gains from the capacity to extract surplus from the rst group
a benet that exceeds the harm it su¤ers as result of more intense competition
for the second group. Discrimination can yield a higher prot only if there is a
su¢ cient disparity in qualities, or equivalently if the ratio  = sL=sH is su¢ -
ciently small. ( < 0:343). Indeed, when the latter condition is not met, there
are no consumers with a strong preference for a particular quality. However,
this condition is not su¢ cient. No rm prefers discrimination if the number
of its captivebuyers is not su¢ ciently large in relation to the number of its
non-captive buyers. This explains why discrimination is Pareto-dominated
only if the ratio of market areas - the ratio of captiveto non-captivebuyers
- takes on intermediate values (FH() <  < FL()). Conversely, discrimina-
tory price schedules are dominant when both rms have captive consumers in
numbers su¢ ciently large relative to non-captivebuyers.
Because market shares and qualities are generally observable, one can de-
termine if the conditions of the last proposition are satised, on the basis of
information about the reservation price of consumers with the highest willing-
ness to pay.
The proposition carries an implication for competition policy: When the con-
ditions stated in the proposition are met, it is unlikely that a sudden switch by
duopolists from discriminatory pricing to uniform pricing - perhaps via adoption
of a most-favored customer clause - is brought about by independent action.
It is useful at this stage to set the results against Choudhary et al. (2005).
These authors focus on the question how price and quality choices vary across
pricing regimes. They do so numerically for a more restricted class of cost
functions. The game, as Choudhary et al. describe it, unfolds as follows: At
stage 1, rms simultaneously choose qualities, at stage 2 they select prices, and
at stage 3 consumers decide which product, if any they purchase. Choudhary et
al. (2005) start with the determination of equilibrium qualities for each of four
exogenously given pricing regimes and then they compare prots across regimes
taking into account of the fact that qualities as well as prices vary from one
regime to the other. They fail to account for the fact that unless rms make a
credible commitment to a particular pricing regime before setting qualities at
stage 1, it is optimal for each of them to choose a discriminatory schedule at
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stage 2. This is true regardless of the qualities selected. For that reason, their
equilibria do not conform to the description of their game and their comparison
of prots does not shed light on the circumstances that give rise to a prisoners
dilemma.
This paper by contrast focuses on the question whether rms have an incen-
tive to agree to price uniformly for a given pair of qualities. This is certainly
appropriate when qualities are given exogeneously. It is also appropriate when
all decisions in regard to pricing follow the selection of qualities and are not con-
strained by the quality choices. The latter assumption appears more reasonable
from an empirical perspective.14
The following corollary compares the aggregate consumer surplus under
regimes (DH ; DL) and (UH ; UL).
Corollary: When the conditions ensuring the existence of a prisoners
dilemma are met, aggregate consumer surplus is higher when rms engage in
personalized pricing than when they price uniformly.
Proof: The proof follows from the denition of aggregate welfare and from
the result that aggregate welfare is maximized when the two rms choose prot-
maximizing discriminatory price schedules.
6 Quality choice by discriminating duopolists.
Until now qualities were given. This section characterizes the equilibrium when
qualities are endogenous. It does so for any density function f() and convex
unit cost function c(s). Do examine quality choices one must add an initial stage
to the game. At this initial stage both rms choose their qualities independently
within a bounded interval [0; S] where the upper value S is the highest quality
allowed by technology. The subsequent stages are identical to the pricing game
studied in the earlier sections. Because it has already been established that the
subgame perfect equilibrium pricing strategy is discrimination by both rms
regardless of quality, it is su¢ cient to consider this regime.
For all sH > sL > 0; the Nash equilibrium in qualities satises the rst
order conditions (21) and (22) below, obtained from di¤erentiation of (9) and
(10) with respect to sH and sL.15Z b
c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL
[   c0 (sH)] f()d = 0 (21)
Z c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL
c(sL)
sL
[   c0 (sL)] f()d = 0 (22)
14We are hesitant to compare our results with Choudhary et al. (2005) because of a com-
putational error in their paper. They nd that the prot of the H- rm in the particular
case where only the L- rm discriminates is equal to the prot of the H-rm when both rms
discriminate. As Table 1 shows the prot of the H-rm under the (UH ; DL) regime is only
half as large as under the (DH ; DL) regime when the distribution of consumer preferences is
uniform.
15Convexity of the unit cost function implies that the second order conditions are satised.
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Conditions (21) and (22) simply state that the marginal cost of each quality
equals the average marginal utility of buyers of that quality.16
The following proposition characterizes the subgame-perfect equilibrium in
qualities
Proposition 5 For any density function of consumer preferences and convex
unit cost of quality, the sub-game perfect equilibrium qualities are socially opti-
mal.
Proof : Total welfare is
W (sH ; sL) =
Z c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL
c(sL)
sL
(sL   c(sL))f () d
+
Z b
c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL
(sH   c(sH))f () d (23)
Di¤erentiation of (23) with respect to sL yields
@W (sH ; sL)
@sL
=
cH cL
sH sLZ
cL
sL
[   c0 (sL)] f () d
+

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL sL   c(sL)

f

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL

@[ c(sH) c(sL)sH sL ]
@sL
 

c(sL)
sL
sL   c(sL)

f

c(sL)
sL

@[ c(sL)sL ]
@sL
 

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL sH   c(sH)

f

c(sH)  c(sL)
sH   sL

@[ c(sH) c(sL)sH sL ]
@sL
= 0 (24)
One easily checks that the sum of the second and fourth terms of (24) is
zero. The reason is that a switch between high and low quality changes the
utility of the consumer  = cH cLsH sL by an amount equal to the di¤erence in cost
of the two qualities. Also, the third term of (24) is zero because for the consumer
 = cLsL a change in quality changes utility by an amount equal to the production
cost. Thus, (24) simplies to (22).
Similarly di¤erentiation of (23) with respect to sH , yieldsh
c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL sL   c(sL)
i
f

c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL

@[
c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL ]
@sH
16 In order to conclude that conditions (21) and (22) dene a Nash equilibrium in qualities,
one must also establish that the rm producing the low quality has no incentive to deviate from
sL [given by (22)] and set quality higher than s

H . But this raises the usual undeterminate
question related to the identity of the rms, namely which one chooses the high quality given
that the other one chooses the low quality.
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+
R c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL
c(sL)
sL
[   c0 (sH)] f()d ()
 
h
c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL sH   c(sH)
i
f

c(sH) c(sL)
sH sL

@[
c(sH ) c(sL)
sH sL ]
@sH
= 0 (25)
which simplies to (21) because the rst and third terms cancel out. QED
The reason why the rms choose welfare maximizing qualities is obvious.
Discrimination allows then to capture all the extra utility generated by an
extra unit of quality. This guarantees that the equilibrium qualities are welfare
maximizing when the cost of quality is convex.
7 Final Remarks
Perfect price discrimination is a Nash equilibrium of the game where quality
di¤erentiated duopolists determine rst whether to commit to a uniform price
and subsequently set prices and sell output. Whether specic consumers are
better o¤ under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the ex-
tent to which they are captive to a particular seller. Discrimination benets
consumers whose preference for one of the qualities is weak when both qualities
are priced at unit cost. With respect to these consumers, the competition e¤ect
of discrimination outweighs the enhanced surplus extraction e¤ect. Consumers
who have a strong preference for a particular quality when both qualities are
priced at unit cost, are worse o¤ under discrimination.
In contrast to earlier contributions, this paper nds that under vertical dif-
ferentiation both duopolists are not necessarily better o¤ when they enforce an
agreement to price uniformly. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for both rms
to earn higher prots under rst-degree discrimination are a su¢ ciently large
disparity in qualities, and a spread of consumer preferences for quality that is
neither too large nor too small.
The paper also establishes that a unilateral move from uniform pricing to
personalized pricing lowers the rival rms prots. For the specic case where
consumer preferences are distributed uniformly, a unilateral deviation from dis-
crimination towards uniform pricing halves the deviating rms prot.
Earlier research has shown that the grant of a most-favored customer clause
by a single duopolist softens price competition and thereby increases the prots
of all market participants. This paper claries why the assumption of uniform
pricing is critical to that outcome. It shows that in the absence of a commitment
to uniform pricing, a unilateral grant of price protection to ones customers is
always harmful to the party that makes the grant. It also provides an easily
veriable condition that antitrust authorities may use to formulate presumptions
about the anticompetitive intent of most-favored-customer clauses.
The paper shows that for any exogenously given quality pair, competition
in discriminatory prices schedules yields a welfare maximizing coverage of the
market, and a welfare maximizing segmentation of the market into buyers of high
and low quality. Furthermore, the qualities chosen by discriminating duopolists
are welfare maximizing.
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The analysis has disregarded the possibility that consumers manipulate the
information that reaches sellers.17 Although some consumers act strategically,
we believe that most do not, as only a minority is aware that information about
their purchasing behavior is shared among sellers and might be used to facilitate
price discrimination.18 It therefore remains useful to model discrimination in
the absence of strategic consumer behavior.
A policy implication of the paper is that a minimum quality standard lowers
aggregate welfare when rms engage in rst-degree discrimination. This con-
trasts with earlier results showing that a mildly restrictive minimum quality re-
quirement increases welfare [Ronnen, 1991, Crampes and Hollander, 1995]. Un-
der uniform pricing welfare increases because the quality requirement increases
market coverage and intensies price competition by narrowing the quality gap.
An intensication of price competition also takes place when the rms discrimi-
nate. The reason, however, is di¤erent. Under discrimination a narrower quality
gap expands the range of non-captive consumers. And, when pricing is discrim-
inatory the minimum quality requirement restricts market coverage.
More importantly, the paper suggest that a reduction of the quality range -
possibly in response to a minimum quality standard - encourages rms to choose
distribution channels that ensure uniform pricing, or to opt for contractual
arrangements that have the same e¤ect. The latter brings about a further
reduction in market coverage, and a suboptimal segmentation of consumers
into high and low quality buyers.
The industrial organization literature has devoted much attention to the
question how market structure a¤ects price. This paper enlarges the perspective
by pointing to a possible relationship between market structure and pricing
regimes. Entry for example a¤ects incentives to agree on unifom pricing when
it reduces the disparity in qualities. Accounting for such possibility adds a new
twist to the welfare e¤ects of entry.
A standard reply to the question what di¤erentiates an incumbent from an
entrant is that the former can credibly commit to a course of action before the
entrant appears on stage. The paper suggests that a greater capacity to engage
in di¤erential pricing may be an important distinguishing characteristic between
an incumbent and an entrant. The pre-entry adoption of discriminatory pricing
by an incumbent reveals information about buyersreservation prices that the
entrant cannot posses. The entrant is more likely - at least initially - to set
a uniform price, or divide consumers into fewer classes than the incumbent.
The nding that a rm which prices uniformly earns less when its competitor
discriminates than when it prices uniformly therefore implies than an incumbent
who discriminates prior to entry is more likely to deter entry than an incumbent
17Much of the information is obtained by analyzing surng patterns and purchasing his-
tory.This raises the question how the choice of pricing regimes is a¤ected when buyers account
for the e¤ect of current purchases on future price o¤ers.Some recent theoretical work (Acquisti
and Varian (2003) and Villas-Boas (2003)) explores this question for the case of a monopolistic
seller.
18Because the skills required to behave strategically are not widespread, one may assume
that the percentage of buyers who behave strategically is even lower.[Turow et al. (2005)]
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who does not.19 This suggests that a threat of entry may be a factor encouraging
an incumbent to incur the sunk cost of acquiring information about consumer
preferences.
The assumption that rms posses full information about individual reserva-
tion prices, and that information is acquired at no cost, obviously lacks realism
(Varian, 2003). Consumer preferences are revealed largely through costly exper-
imentation (Caminal and Matutes, 1990, Sha¤er and Zhang, 2000). Also, the
cost of dividing consumers into di¤erent classes increases with the number of
classes. For that reason the problem is not how to choose between perfect price
discrimination and uniform pricing. It is to determine the optimal number of
consumer classes. One may well nd that the equilibrium number of consumer
classes depends on the disparity of qualities. Exactly how will have to await
further research.
19See in this regard Aguirre et al., 1998.There is clearly no reason for the incumbent to
move to uniform pricing post entry because discriminatory pricing gives the incumbent higher
prots regardless of the price policy adopted by the entrant
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Appendix 1: Non-existence of an equilibrium when simultaneously the H-
rm chooses a uniform price and the L-rm chooses a personalized price scheme.
Proposition 6 The one-stage game where the high quality rm sets a uniform
price and the low quality rm personalizes prices does not have an equilibrium
in pure strategies.
Proof: We restrict the proof to the case of a uniform density where f() = 1b
for all  2 [0; b] : We already know that for a uniform price pH  cH , a best
response of the low quality rm is given by:
pL(; pH) =
8<:
sL for
cL
sL
   pHsH
pH   (sH   sL) for pHsH <  
pH cL
sH sL
cL for
pH cL
sH sL <   b
The prot of the high quality rm is therefore
H(pH ; pL(:; pH)) =
1
b
(pH   cH)(b  pH   cL
sH   sL )
We show rst that a pair [pH ; pL(; pH)] where pH > cH cannot be an
equilibrium. Take pH > cH and consider a deviation by rm H lowering its
price to epH = pH    where 0 <  < pH   cH : Consumers with  2 ]pHsH ; pH cLsH sL ]
switch to the high quality because sH   pH +  > sL   pH + (sH   sL):
Post deviation, the prot of the high quality rm is eH = 1b (epH   cH)(b  epHsH ):
Therefore, eH   H = 1b [ (b   epHsH ) + (pH   cH)(pH cLsH sL   epHsH )]: Because the
second term on the right-hand-side can be made larger in absolute value than
the rst term, the deviation increases the prots of the high quality rm. This
proves that there cannot be an equilibrium in pure strategies where pH > cH :
Consider now the case pH = cH which entails H = 0: The best response of
rm L is to sell to consumers  2
h
cH cL
sH sL ; b
i
at unit cost cL: If rm H deviates
by choosing pH = cH +
1
2 [b(sH   sL)   (cH   cL)] > cH , the consumer  who
is indi¤erent between high quality sold at pH and low quality sold at unit cost
must is dened by  = pH cLsH sL =
1
2 [b+
cH cL
sH sL ]. Post deviation, the H rm earns
H =
1
b (pH   cH)(b  ) > 0. This completes the proof.
Appendix 2: Derivation of Table 1
7.0.1 Regime (UH ; DL)
The best response of the L-rm to a commitment by the H-rm is given by
(11) in the text. H(UH ; DL) = 1b [pH   cH ][b   pH cLsH sL ] attains a maximimum
for pUH ;DLH =
1
2 [cH + cL + b(sH   sL)] implying
H(UH ; DL) =
1
2b [cL   cH + b (sH   sL)]
h
b  12

cH cL
sH sL + b
i
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= sH sL4b [b   cH cLsH sL ]2:Note that b > cH cLsH sL entails p
UH ;DL
H > cH : And,
substitution of pUH ;DLH into (11) yields:
pUH ;DLL () =
8>>>><>>>>:
cL for   12
h
cH cL
sH sL + b
i
cH+cL+(b 2)(sH sL)
2 for
1
2
cH+cL+b(sH sL)
sH
< 
< 12 [
cH cL
sH sL + b]
sL for
cL
sL
   12 cH+cL+b(sH sL)sH
The quantity sold by the L-rm is 1b

1
2 [
cH cL
sH sL + b]  cLsL

: The low quality
buyer who pays the highest price has preference index  = 12
cH+cL+b(sH sL)
sH
and
pays the amount cH+cL+b(sH sL)2   cH+cL+b(sH sL)2sH (sH sL) =
cH+cL+b(sH sL)
2
sl
sH
:
The prot earned from that consumer is

cH cL+2cL+b(sH sL)
2sH

sL   cL =
(sH sL)
2
sL
sH

b+ cH cLsH sL

+ sLsH cL   cL
= (sH sL)2
sL
sH

b+ cH cLsH sL

  (sH sL)sH cL =
sL(sH sL)
sH
h
1
2

b+ cH cLsH sL

  cLsL
i
:
Because the distribution of 0s is uniform, the average prot per unit sold
by the L-rm is half that amount. Therefore,
L= 12b
sL(sH sL)
sH
[ 12 (b+
cH cL
sH sL )  cLsL ]2:
7.0.2 Regime (DH ; UL)
When the L-rm commits to a uniform price pL 2]cL; cH [; the H-rm responds
by choosing (16). The prot of the L-rm is L(DH ; UL) = 1b [pL  cL][ cH pLsH sL  
pL
sL
]: It attains a maximum for pDH ;ULL =
1
2
h
cL +
sL
sH
cH
i
= sL2
h
cH
sH
+ cLsL
i
imply-
ing
pDH ;ULL   cL = sL2
h
cH
sH
  cLsL
i
:
Also, cH pLsH sL =
2cH cL  sLsH cH
sH sL =
1
2

cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH

; and
p
DH;UL
L
sL
= 12 (
cL
sL
+ cHsH ):
Because sL < sH , it must be true that p
DH ;UL
L 2]cL; cH [:
Therefore L = 1b
sL
2
h
cH
sH
  cLsL
i h
1
2

cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH

  12 ( cLsL + cHsH )
i
=
sL
4b
h
cH
sH
  cLsL
i h
cH cL
sH sL   cLsL
i
The market segment served by the H-rm is
b  cH pLsH sL = b 
2cH  cL  sLsH cH
2(sH sL) =
b  cH  cL+(1 
sL
sH
)cH
2(sH sL) = b  12
h
cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH
i
:
Substitution of pDH ;ULL into (16) yields
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pDH ;ULH () =8<:
1
2
h
cL +
sL
sH
cH
i
+ (sH   sL) for 12
h
cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH
i
   b
cH for  <
1
2
h
cH cL
sH sL +
cH
sH
i
The average prot margin of the H-rm over the segment it serves is:
1
2

pDH ;ULH (b)  cH

= 12
h
1
2

cL +
sL
sH
cH

+ b (sH   sL)  cH
i
= sH sL2
h
b  cH cL2(sH sL)   sH sL2(sH sL) cHsH
i
= sH sL2
h
b  12

cH cL
(sH sL) +
cH
sH
i
:
Thus, the prot of the H-rm is
H(DH ; UL) =
sH sL
2b
h
b  12

cH cL
(sH sL) +
cH
sH
i2
:
When pL  cH , the H-rm sells to all consumers with  2
h
cH
sH
; b
i
for a price
pH() = sH : No consumer with  2
h
cL
sL
; cHsH
i
is willing to purchase low quality
product at the uniform price pL  cH : More pointedly, when pL  cH ; the high
quality producer has a monopoly position and the low quality producer has no
market at all. Therefore, choosing pL  cH is never rational on the part of a
leader who produces the low quality.
7.0.3 Regime (UH ; UL)
This is the standard case examined in the literature [Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Moorthy (1988, 1991)]. Prot functions are
H(pH ; pL) =
1
b (pH cH)(b  pH pLsH sL ) and L(pH ; pL) = 1b (pL cL)(
pH pL
sH sL 
pL
cL
):
Simultaneous choice of prices by each rm yields pUH ;ULH =
sH
4sH sL [2b(sH sL)+
2cH + cL] and p
UH ;UL
L =
1
4sH sL [bsL(sH   sL) + 2cLsH + cHsL]
Substitution into the prot function yields the prots that appear in Table
1.
Appendix 3: Proof of the lemma.
The inequality
H(DH ; DL) =
sH sL
2b [b  cH cLsH sL ]2 > H(UH ; UL) =
4s2H(sH sL)
(4sH sL)2b [b  12 ( cH cLsH sL + cHsH )]2 =
4s2H(sH sL)
(4sH sL)2b [b  cH cLsH sL + 12 ( cH cLsH sL   cHsH )]2 is equivalent to
b  cH cLsH sL > 2
p
2sH
4sH sL [b  cH cLsH sL + 12 sLsH ( cH cLsH sL   cLsL )] orh
b  cH cLsH sL
i
[1  2
p
2sH
4sH sL ] >
p
2 sH4sH sL
sL
sH
[ cH cLsH sL   cLsL ]: Thus,
H(DH ; DL) > H(UH ; UL),  > FH() =
p
2
4  2p2   (21)
Because L(DH ; DL) = sL2b [
cH cL
sH sL   cLsL ][ cHsH   cLsL ] =
sL(sH sL)
2bsH
[ cH cLsH sL   cLsL ]2
and L(UH ; UL) =
4sLsH(sH sL)
(4sH sL)2b [
1
2 (b+
cH cL
sH sL )  cLsL )]2 we have L(DH ; DL) >
22
L(UH ; UL) if and only if cH cLsH sL   cLsL < 2
p
2sH
4sH sL [
1
2 (b  cH cLsH sL ) + ( cH cLsH sL   cLsL )]
or
( cH cLsH sL   cLsL )

1  2
p
2sH
4sH sL

<
p
2sH
4sH sL (b  cH cLsH sL )
Thus
L(DH ; DL) > L(UH ; UL),  < FL() = 4  2
p
2  p
2
(22)
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